Abstract In this paper, we examine herding across asset classes and industry levels. We also study what incentives managers at various layers of the financial industry face when investing. To do so, we use unique and detailed monthly portfolios between 1996 and 2005 from pension funds in Chile, a pioneer in pension-fund reform. The results show that pension funds herd more in assets that have more risk and for which pension funds have less market information. Furthermore, the results show that herding is more prevalent for funds that narrowly compete with each other, namely, when comparing funds of the same type across pension fund administrators (PFAs). There is much less herding across PFAs as a whole and in individual pension funds within PFAs. These herding patterns are consistent with incentives for managers to be close to industry benchmarks, and might be also driven by market forces and partly by regulation.
Introduction
This paper uses a unique and rich micro data set of pension funds to shed new light on how incentives might affect institutional investors in their portfolio allocation decisions. In particular, we study two aspects discussed in the literature but still relatively unexplored: (i) how institutional investors trade in different types of assets, and (ii) what incentives managers at various levels of the financial industry face when implementing their investment strategies. We focus on herding statistics because they are widely used and are important measures to analyze. Among other things, herding can contribute to market volatility and might mean that managers are not generating independent assessments and not providing distinct services to the underlying investors. The analysis of herding also helps to more broadly understand the role of institutional investors in capital market activity, such as capital raising and trading. Furthermore, the paper offers new evidence on the importance of several factors linked to the behavior of institutional investors; such as information, liquidity, incentives related to organizational aspects of the financial industry, and the regulatory framework in which managers operate.
Institutional investors are interesting to analyze not only because they have become very large, but also because detailed asset-level portfolios over time (unavailable at the household or retail-investor level) are sometimes accessible. In particular, institutional investors are increasingly relevant for both asset management and the development of financial systems. In fact, they are likely to be among the most important conduits of private and public savings, intermediating funds and supplying capital for firms and countries to grow. As institutional investors became prevalent, the research on how they invest flourished. 1 In this paper, we exploit new data and analyze the investment behavior of pension funds for which relatively little is known, although they have played a crucial role across countries. 2 In particular, we use data from Chile that was the first country to embrace the new mandatory, privately managed, defined-contribution (DC) pension fund model by replacing the public, defined-benefit (DB) pension system in 1981. Many developed and developing countries have followed suit and reformed their pension regimes in a similar way (e.g., Argentina, Colombia, Hungary, Lithuania, Mexico, Peru, Slovakia, Sweden, Poland, and the UK).
The data we assemble contain the detailed portfolios of the universe of Chilean pension funds in all types of securities and asset classes at a monthly frequency for a 10-year period from 1996 to 2005. We also compile the monthly returns of each instrument included in these portfolios. The data set contains 3,869,290 observations with information on the holdings and returns of 24,322 different securities for up to 57 pension funds. We then compute different estimates of herding that have an association with funds buying or selling the same assets simultaneously.
This unique data set allows us to shed new light on a series of questions related to different aspects of pension fund investment strategies and their overall behavior. In counter (OTC).
3 Mortgage bonds are safer than corporate bonds because they are backed by real estate. The asset class in which the least herding occurs is government bonds, which have the lowest risk. Across different levels of the industry, pension funds tend to herd more in the asset classes that are more opaque. This result is consistent with pension funds trying to copy each other in their portfolio decisions, especially for the assets for which there is less information from the markets.
Third, herding is the most intense when comparing funds of the same type across PFAs. That is, herding peaks as funds narrowly compete with each other across PFAs to retain pensioners and/or avoid market or regulatory punishment. PFAs as a whole also herd but less intensively, because administrators are not so narrowly compared with each other. The least intense herding occurs among funds within PFAs, where competition is less prevalent as the incentives are for PFAs to keep pensioners in any of the funds that the PFA has.
Fourth, we do not find evidence that momentum trading is the main cause of the herding observed in domestic assets.
Fifth, although the patterns in this paper might be influenced by the regulation that induces funds across PFAs to compare with each other, the investment decisions of fund managers cannot be neglected because there is no specific mandate for pension funds to trade in specific securities and herding does not decrease when regulations are relaxed. Moreover, the behavior does not seem to be explained by the lack of investable instruments because pension funds do not invest in all of the available and pre-approved assets.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes the case of Chile and its pension fund system. Section 3 describes the data and some basic turnover statistics. Section 4 studies different turnover measures. Section 5 explores what other factors might be related to herding behavior. Section 6 concludes.
Chile's pension fund system
Chile is a good natural case study to analyze in depth the behavior of pension funds and, more broadly, institutional investors. In 1980, Chile decided to reform its pension fund system and replaced over time the pay-as-you-go scheme with a fully funded capitalization one based on individual accounts operated by private pension fund administrators (PFAs). Under the new system, pensioners choose their PFA and the specific funds in which they invest. Pensioners can switch their PFA at any point in time and reallocate their investments across funds. Since 2002, the multi-fund period begins, when each PFA offers five different funds (Funds A-E), with Fund A (Fund E) being the most (least) risky.
The mandate of each pension fund is to provide the highest possible returns to pensioners given the set of risk parameters and investment regulations. For example, there are no restrictions on the amount and type of trading activity. Pension fund managers do not have liabilities with the pensioners; they simply manage their assets. Pension funds are subject to a minimum return regulation that establishes that the PFAs are responsible for ensuring an average real rate of return over the preceding 36 months (12 months before October 1999).
The portfolio of each fund is managed by managers that compete on a frequent basis to obtain the best possible returns. PFAs hire the managers and might fire them if their performance lags behind. Within a PFA, pension fund portfolios are managed separately, but the PFA provides market analysis to all its funds.
Over time, pension fund administrators have grown substantially and have become the largest institutional investors in Chile. As a share of GDP, assets managed by pension funds increased by 1.85 times, from 38 % in 1996 to 71 % in 2005. Figure 1 shows the evolution of pension system holdings as a share of GDP. Appendix 1 provides more information about the regulations and evolution of the system.
Data and turnover statistics
The data set used in this paper comes from Chile's Superintendency of Pensions (Superintendencia de Pensiones, SP). It consists of a monthly panel of all the portfolio investments of PFAs in operation and for each of their funds during the period of July 1996 to December 2005. However, because of the richness of the data, a large part of the analysis in this paper focuses on the multifund period (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) . The data set has information on the price and quantity for every security held by a fund per unit of time. We define a fund as a pair PFA/fund type (e.g., Fund C of PFA Aporta configures a single fund). After cleaning the data set, we use 3,869,290 observations that represent all domestic fixed-income securities and domestic equity held during each month by at least one fund and that contain information on the holdings of 24,322 different securities for up to 57 funds. These securities are divided into 20 different instrument types. We group all the instrument types into five general asset classes: corporate bonds, financial-institution bonds, government bonds, mortgage bonds, and equity. 4, 5 The securities analyzed in this paper vary across different dimensions associated with the availability of market information on issuing companies and the availability of quoted and realized market prices for institutional investors. Table 2 shows characteristics for the multifund period of issuances, trading activity, and size of issuers for some of the asset classes analyzed in this paper: corporate bonds (including those issued by financial institutions, which tend to be similar to corporate bonds), government bonds, and equity. 6 During the sample period, issuance per year is highest for corporate bonds, followed by government bonds, and lastly equity (Panel A). This is expected because many companies issue bonds, and they have to continue issuing them over time as bonds mature and firms seek refinancing. But the amount issued in corporate bonds per company is much smaller than the total amount issued by the government, and similar to the equity issued per company.
7 Panel B shows data on turnover ratios (annual value traded divided by end-of-the-year market capitalization) across these three asset classes. Clearly, government bonds are the asset class with the highest turnover, followed by equity, and corporate bonds. Government bonds and equities not only have higher turnover than corporate bonds, but also are more frequently traded in open exchanges (Panel C). For instance, equities from the 40 listed companies that comprise the main Chilean stock market index (IPSA) traded on 92 % of the trading days in 2004. Government bonds with maturities of between 8to 10 years also traded almost every day. In contrast, corporate bonds with the same maturities traded 46 % of the time during that year.
8 Finally, companies listed in the stock exchange are typically larger than those that issue corporate bonds. Panel D compares the median size of the main listed companies and of those companies that have issued corporate bonds. It shows that, despite corporate bond issuers being relatively large in Chile, they are In summary, the data show that government bonds are widely available, frequently traded, and have easily available price information. Equity markets are dominated by large corporations, whose stocks trade frequently in open exchanges. Corporations issuing corporate bonds are smaller than those that issue equity; some issuances are large, but they are infrequently traded, and a nontrivial part of this activity occurs over the counter. These differences suggest that corporate bonds are probably the most opaque of the Chilean asset classes, followed by equity, and finally government bonds.
To complement the analysis, we display here some basic measures of turnover or trading activity on different types of securities by pension funds. Turnover generally has a relation to market liquidity, which is vital for the emergence of new instruments, capital raising activity, and the functioning of secondary markets. More trading reduces the cost of immediate execution, which lowers bid-ask spreads and reduces the firm's opportunity cost of capital. Panel A of Table 3 shows that pension funds tend to trade infrequently. In particular, Panel A shows what fraction of its assets a given PFA trades at any point in time. The table presents two simple statistics: the number of total assets traded by a PFA in a given period relative to the total number of holdings in the PFA's overall portfolio (column 1) and the value of the aggregate portfolio that experiences some activity in a given month (column 2), both averaged over time.
10 On average, a PFA trades only 15.6 % of its assets and the monthly changes in positions in those assets correspond to just 3.4 % of the initial total value of the PFA's assets. This low number contrasts with the 88 % of the mean turnover ratio found in Kacperczyk et al. (2008) for a sample of 2,543 actively managed US equity mutual funds between 1984 and 2003, suggesting that Chilean PFAs are rather passive in their trading behavior. There is important variation across asset classes in the degree of PFA trading activity. The most traded assets are equities and mortgage bonds. On the other hand, there is a low degree of trading in corporate and financial-institution bonds.
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An alternative way to gauge the extent to which managers are actively trading their portfolios is to focus on fixed-income instruments (which are also of fixed term). The useful feature of these assets is that they do not need to be traded to recover the initial investment, as managers can wait until maturity and collect coupons in the meantime. Panel B of Table 3 presents two statistics per asset class: (i) the average proportion of units of a given security that a PFA incorporates into its portfolio in its first purchase, and (ii) the proportion of units of that security that a PFA liquidates at the security's maturity date. Both measures are relative to the maximum number of units of that security that the PFA holds in its portfolio at any time. They show that PFAs tend to purchase most of their fixed-income assets at once 9 See, for example, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) , Chordia et al. (2001) , and Bekaert et al. (2007) . 10 Infrequent trading does not necessarily mean that PFAs do not actively change the relative composition of their portfolios because, even if most assets are not traded, their relative importance depends on the changes experienced by those that are active. 11 The turnover measures described above are useful to determine the extent to which PFAs rebalance their portfolios, but they do not appropriately capture the extent to which that rebalancing is passive or active. In other words, part of the turnover might just be the consequence of passive trading due to: (i) the constant net inflows PFAs receive from current contributors that have not yet retired, or (ii) outflows due to pensioners retiring and leaving the system. Passive trading might also occur because some assets mature and, in order to reinvest them, PFAs need to purchase new instruments. Therefore, the amount of active turnover and the number of managers willing to change positions over time to maximize returns is lower than the turnover measures reported above. Table 3 Pension Fund Trading Activity Measures. Panel A presents trading statistics using data from the multi-fund period (2002 to 2005) . Column (1) presents the average percentage of assets traded each month by PFAs as a share of the total number of assets held in their portfolios. Column (2) presents the average across PFAs of the difference in weights (contemporaneous weights minus lagged weights using lagged prices for both) for the traded portfolio, calculated at the PFA level. Columns (3) presents the average percentage of assets traded by funds as a share of the total number of assets held in their portfolios. Column (4) reports the average across funds of the difference in weights for the traded portfolio, calculated at the PFA-fund level. Panel B presents the average proportion of units of a given security that a PFA incorporates into its portfolio in its first purchase and the proportion of units of the security that a PFA liquidates at the security's maturity date. Both measures are relative to the maximum number of units of that security that the PFA holds in its portfolio at any time; they are calculated at the PFA level and the PFAfund level across all instruments for each asset class and averaged across PFAs or PFA-funds. For both ratios, the average and standard deviations are presented for each asset class 
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(5) and liquidate most of them upon maturity, not before. That is, although pension funds might hold a large fraction of the outstanding securities, they trade a small fraction of them in secondary markets. This buy-and-hold behavior is common in this type of institutional investor, although it runs contrary to the idea that pension funds provide liquidity to secondary markets. Nonetheless, even in fixed-income assets, pension funds still trade between 5 and 10 % of their holdings over the lifetime of the asset.
Do pension funds herd?
To formally test for the presence of herding, we compute different estimates of herding. These measures focus on whether funds simultaneously buy or sell the same assets at the same time. We measure the degree of herding using the approach by Lakonishok et al. (1992) in which, when there is no herding, the probability of buying has to be equal among the assets being traded. Therefore, a measure of the difference between the probabilities of buying across assets provides a test of the hypothesis of no herding. Lakonishok et al. (1992) herding statistic by asset class at the PFA level considering each PFA as an individual entity. The herding statistic is calculated using the asset-specific probability of buying an asset at any point in time. The herding statistic over all asset classes is calculated based on the average portfolio share of each asset class. Columns (1), (2), and (3) present the results considering assets traded by more than one, more than two, and more than three PFAs, respectively. Numbers represent percentages (results are multiplied by 100). Column (4) presents the average asset-specific probability of buying an asset, calculated over the assets traded by more than one PFA, by asset class. In particular, Lakonishok et al. (1992) define the herding statistic H(i,t) as:
where p(t) is the probability of buying any asset at time t, B(i,t) is the number of funds that increase their holdings of asset i at time t (buyers), S(i,t) is the number of sellers of asset i at time t, and N i; t ð Þ ¼ B i; t ð Þ þ S i; t ð Þ the number of funds active on asset i at time t (i.e., either buying or selling), and AF(i,t) is an adjustment factor. To calculate the herding statistic, we identify a purchase (sale) as an increase (decrease) in the number of units of a given asset held by a PFA.
Under the hypothesis that no herding occurs, the number of buyers B(i,t) follows a binomial distribution with parameters p(t) and N(i,t), and the adjustment factor AF(i,t) is the expected value of the first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (1) under this hypothesis, which is positive because of the use of the absolute value. Therefore, if no herding occurs we should be unable to reject the null hypothesis that the herding statistic has a zero mean.
The adjustment factor AF(i,t) is:
where p(i,t) is the probability of buying an asset i at time t. The proportion of all funds that buy during period t is used as a proxy for E [ p (i,t)]. And due to the assumption that the number of buyers in each period follows a binomial distribution, then AF(i,t) can be calculated as:
which can be further simplified in order to carry out the calculations. As explained earlier, our data have information on the detailed portfolios of all pension funds managed by all of the PFAs. Furthermore, we know which PFA manages each of the funds. We use this information to test for the presence of herding at four levels of aggregation. First, we test for herding at the PFA level (aggregating all funds managed by a PFA in a single portfolio). This neglects within-PFA herding and only considers herding among administrators. Second, we also test for herding at the PFA-fund level that considers herding both within each administrator and across all administrators. Two or more funds within a PFA or across PFAs buying the same asset equally contribute to this herding statistic. Third, we consider herding at the within-PFA level, which only looks at whether funds managed by the same PFA tend to buy or sell the same assets together. Finally, we test for the presence of herding across PFAs, but within a given fund type. Only funds of the same type (from A to E) trading the same assets count for the computation of this statistic. Testing for herding at these different levels of aggregation provides valuable information on the determinants of herding and the incentives that managers have to engage in this behavior. Table 4 reports the herding results at the PFA level with each entry displaying the mean of the herding statistic for each asset class and its corresponding standard error by using an asset-class-specific probability of buying an asset. Column (1) presents the results obtained computing the statistic across all assets traded by more than one PFA. To show the robustness of the results to different estimates of herding, columns (2) and (3) report the herding statistics computed over those assets traded by more than two or three PFAs. Column (4) reports the average asset-specific probabilities of buying an asset for each asset class (p(t)). For example, the average probability of buying instruments from domestic financial institutions (conditional on trading them) is 51 % and the average probability of buying mortgage bonds is 13 %.
The results in Table 4 show that there is robust evidence of herding, both overall and across asset classes. Except for government bonds traded by more than one PFA, there are positive and statistically significant coefficients regardless of the number of PFAs trading a given asset. The results also show significant differences in the coefficients of herding across asset classes within each column. Herding seems to be stronger for corporate bonds and financial-institution bonds. This ranking of herding across asset classes closely resembles the differences in market transparency of different asset classes documented in Section 3. As shown in Table 2 , while Chilean corporate bonds are typically issued by relatively large companies, they are much less frequently traded than equities and government bonds, and part of these trades occur in more opaque, over-the-counter markets rather than in open exchanges.
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Except in the case of mortgage bonds, the different columns show that the prevalence of herding increases as the number of PFAs trading an asset increases (columns (1) to (3)). When focusing on column (3), on those assets traded by more than half of the active PFAs, we find significant evidence of herding for all asset classes. The economic magnitude of the herding statistic is close to the evidence reported for mutual funds in developed countries in the literature, but still significantly higher in some asset classes when considering instruments traded by most PFAs (column (3)). As an example, herding in corporate bonds is 14 % when considering assets traded by more than three PFAs, up from 10 % when considering assets traded by more than two PFAs, and up from 3 % when considering assets traded by more than one PFA. In the case of mortgage bonds, we find less herding for the measures that consider bonds traded by more PFAs. This result is expected because the number of specific mortgage bonds in the markets is very large but each bond is small. Therefore, the probability of a mortgage bond being traded by more than two PFAs is small.
Overall, the results indicate that the presence of herding among Chilean PFAs in many asset classes increases as more PFAs trade an asset. In other words, although PFAs hold few assets, when various PFAs are active they tend to be on the same side of the trade. Table 5 reports similar herding estimates to those in Table 4 (i.e., at the PFA level) but constrains the sample to the multi-fund period, 2002-2005, in which more funds become available. The results show that herding is still prevalent among corporate bonds and financialinstitution bonds but significantly less so in other asset classes, except for a couple of instances for mortgage bonds and government bonds. Again, as more PFAs trade assets the herding statistics increase. The differences in results between Tables 4 and 5 suggest that part of the herding might be driven by competition between pension funds, not PFAs, since herding is stronger when including the period for which only one or two funds per PFA are available (Table 4) . 13 As the number of funds within PFAs increases, the degree of herding across asset classes diminishes.
Given that trading at the fund level seems to explain part of the herding, Table 6 shows herding statistics using all funds across PFAs, without distinguishing the PFA or type of each fund. That is, this herding measure is computed at the most disaggregate level by taking into account the within-PFA and across-PFA variation across any type of fund. The results in Table 6 show again that herding is more prevalent in corporate bonds and financialinstitution bonds. However, the point estimates are noticeably smaller than those in Table 5 . For example, in the case of corporate bonds traded by more than three PFAs, the herding statistic in Table 6 is 4.58, while in Table 5 it is 20.55. The only result that does not follow this pattern is the degree of herding in equities for which coefficients become statistically significant in Table 6 . In other words, part of the herding in equities is explained by the fundlevel behavior. Because different fund types face different regulatory limits on their portfolio allocations, it is not surprising that the herding statistic is lower when considering the trades conducted by different fund types (given that they invest in different asset classes).
These differences in regulatory constraints cannot fully account for the observed decline in herding because they only restrict the composition of a fund's portfolio across asset classes. Whereas these constraints could reduce the degree of overall herding computed by pooling all asset classes, Table 6 shows that the decline in herding occurs within each asset class. In sum, while the results in Table 6 suggest that fund-level herding is important, they leave unanswered the question of how funds specifically interact with each other in their trading and herding activity. Table 7 reports the results from herding among funds within PFAs. As above, the comparison within asset classes eases concerns about the different compositions of the portfolios of different types of funds. While there is still significantly more herding for corporate bonds and financial-institution bonds, the herding statistics are also significant for Lakonishok et al. (1992) herding statistic by asset class at the PFA level by using data only from a multi-fund period (2002 to 2005) . Each PFA is considered like an individual entity. The herding statistic is calculated using the assetspecific probability of buying an asset at any point in time. The herding statistic over all asset classes is calculated based on the average portfolio share of each asset class. Columns (1), (2), and (3) present the results considering assets traded by more than one, more than two, and more than three PFAs, respectively. Numbers represent percentages (results are multiplied by 100). Column (4) presents the average asset-specific probability of buying an asset, calculated over the assets traded by more than one PFA, by asset class. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % levels, respectively. Standard errors are presented in parentheses government bonds and, in one instance, for mortgage bonds. These results hold when more than two and more than three funds trade assets. The results then suggest that part of the herding in government bonds is driven by PFAs purchasing those securities for several of their funds. In fact, PFAs participate actively in government bond auctions, demanding a significant proportion of the securities that come to markets (Opazo et al. 2009 ). Table 8 shows the results from comparing funds within fund types across PFAs. Interestingly, the herding statistics increase noticeably across the board in this case, both in terms of the point estimates and the statistical significance of the coefficients. For example, relative to the estimates at the PFA level, the average herding across asset classes in Table 8 is 5.22 for assets traded by more than two funds versus 2.00 in Table 5 , and 3.71 for assets traded by more than one fund versus -1.01 in Table 5 . The asset classes that experience more herding are corporate bonds and financial-institution bonds. The ones that experience less herding are government bonds and mortgage bonds. Equity is in the middle. What is also clear from this table is that the herding in equity is driven almost exclusively by herding within fund types across PFAs. Lakonishok et al. (1992) herding statistic by asset class at the PFA-fund level by using data from a multi-fund period (2002 to 2005) . Each fund in each PFA is considered like an individual entity. The herding statistic is calculated using the asset-specific probability of buying an asset at any point in time. The herding statistic over all asset classes is calculated based on the average portfolio share of each asset class. Columns (1), (2), and (3) present the results considering assets traded by more than one, more than two, and more than three funds, respectively. Numbers represent percentages (results are multiplied by 100). Column (4) presents the average asset-specific probability of buying an asset, calculated over the assets traded by more than one fund, by asset class. To further understand where the trading behavior is coming from, Table 8 also presents a decomposition of herding into herding in buying and herding in selling, following Grinblatt et al. (1995) .
14 In general, the results suggest that herding occurs at both sides of the transactions. That is, pension funds herd both when they purchase securities and when they sell them in secondary markets. The only exception is the case of mortgage bonds that show herding just on the buying side. This might be due to pre-payment and restructuring of those bonds, which might lead pension funds to remove them from their portfolios at different points in time. Table 9 decomposes herding by type of fund and shows that the result of herding within fund types is not due to herding in only one type of fund. Instead, herding within fund types across PFAs occurs across all types of funds. Lakonishok et al. (1992) herding statistic by asset class by using data from a multi-fund period (2002 to 2005) . The herding statistic is calculated within PFAs and across funds and then averaged across PFAs, using the asset-specific probability of buying an asset at any point in time. The herding statistic over all asset classes is calculated based on the average portfolio share of each asset class. Columns (1), (2), and (3) present the results considering assets traded by more than one, more than two, and more than three funds, respectively. Numbers represent percentages (results are multiplied by 100). Column (4) presents the average asset-specific probability of buying an asset, calculated over the assets traded by more than one fund, by asset class. Grinblatt et al. (1995) methodology and using only data from the multi-fund period (2002 to 2005) . The herding statistic is calculated within fund type and across PFAs, and then averaged across funds by using the asset-specific probability of buying an asset at any point in time. The herding statistic over all asset classes is calculated based on the average portfolio share of each asset class. Columns (1), (2), and (3) present the results considering assets traded by more than one PFA. Columns (4), (5), and (6) present the results for assets traded by more than two PFAs. Columns (7), (8), and (9) show the results for more than three PFAs. Numbers represent percentages (results are multiplied by 100). Column (10) presents the average asset-specific probability of buying an asset, calculated over the assets traded by more than one fund, by asset class. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % levels, respectively. Standard errors are presented in parentheses
As mentioned in Section 3, pension funds tend to purchase fixed-income securities at issuance and hold them until maturity. The herding statistics reported here do not include the dates when instruments are removed from the markets. So they are not affected by the maturing fixed-income instruments. However, they do include initial purchases at issuance. While this does not pose a bias to the estimates, it raises the question of whether herding is driven mainly by these initial acquisitions. To answer this question, we re-compute the herding statistics excluding purchases at issuance for fixed-income assets. We do so for the estimates at the PFA level and within fund types across PFAs. Relative to Table 4 , the estimates at the PFA level show that herding is prevalent even after the purchases at issuance, when securities are bought in secondary markets. 15 However, as expected, the herding estimates for fixed-income securities are lower when initial acquisitions are removed from the sample. Relative to the previous tables, the ranking of herding across asset classes holds. Compared to Table 8, the estimates within fund types across PFAs yield similar conclusions. The results are reported in the working paper version of this paper (Raddatz and Schmukler 2011). *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % levels, respectively. Standard errors of the average coefficient are presented in parentheses. In addition, this table presents the percentage of positive and negative coefficients that are statistically significant at a 10 % level. The dashes in column (5) indicate that equity is not traded by Fund E 5 What other factors might be related to herding?
Aside from the herding studied so far, which refers to contemporaneous herding, there can also be dynamic herding if funds follow the herd with a lag. Therefore, assets that are more heavily traded in a given period are also more likely to be traded in subsequent periods. Sias (2004) studies this dimension of herding and tests the hypothesis that the intensity of trading is serially correlated. We do so by estimating the parameter β t in the following equation for each month t:
, Raw i,t is the fraction of PFAs buying asset i at time t among those active (B i; t ð Þ=N i; t ð Þ in the previous notation), and Raw t and σ(Raw) t are the average and standard deviation of Raw i,t among all assets i, respectively. The parameter β t corresponds, *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % levels, respectively. Standard errors are presented in parentheses therefore, to the serial correlation of the standardized fractions of PFAs that are buying an asset, which is permitted to vary with time.
16 Table 10 reports the results on dynamic herding. Each entry in the table reports the average β t across months for various asset classes, its standard error, and the fraction of periods in which the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10 % level. When considering all the active assets across classes (first row in column 1), we find evidence of a significantly negative serial correlation in trades. Assets that are more intensively bought in a given month are significantly less likely to be bought during the next month. Moreover, this significantly negative coefficient occurs in all of the 1-month regressions. The rest of the results reported in column (1) indicate that the negative serial correlation is present in almost all asset classes with domestic equities being the only asset class in which there is significant evidence of positive dynamic herding. One possible explanation for this finding is that pension funds cannot quickly adjust their positions in domestic equity markets.
As mentioned in the introduction, aside from herding, there can also be momentum trading. A fund is typically called a momentum trader if, on average, it sells assets with low past performance and purchases securities with high past returns. On the other hand, a fund that sells past winners and buys past losers is called a contrarian trader, and a fund that follows none of these strategies is a non-momentum trader. The working paper version of this study shows evidence of momentum trading.
Momentum trading might explain the previous results on herding. If funds chase returns, they tend to buy assets when their returns are positive and look like they are following each other; when instead, they are following returns. However, the results from Table 11 suggest that momentum trading does not explain herding. In particular, the herding statistics are unrelated to the lagged returns of the assets included in each class. In unreported results, the same conclusions are reached if one analyzes dynamic herding instead. These conclusions suggest that managers' common preferences over asset characteristics, such as stocks with high past returns, do not seem to drive herding behavior.
Regulation might also play a role in the findings on herding. Chilean PFAs are subject to a minimum return requirement relative to the average return that might induce fund managers to mechanically herd around the average portfolio to avoid penalties. The time variation of the herding measures can help to determine the impact of changes in regulation. In October 1999, the average real rate of return to calculate the minimum return changed from 12 months to 36 months. This greater flexibility was expected to reduce the degree of herding, because the reform gave managers more time to converge to the average return. However, the data show no evidence of a decline in herding around the date of the reform. Table 12 compares the herding statistics computed in windows of 18 months before and after October 1999 for each asset class. For most asset classes, instead of a decline, we observe an increase in the herding statistic after the reform. Only among mortgage bonds, is there evidence of a small decline in herding. Thus, these findings do not support the claim that herding is mainly due to the tightness of the regulatory band.
In addition, we analyze the possibility that herding behavior might be driven by the regulatory minimum return band by comparing the degree of herding observed across funds that face different regulatory bands according to their risk profiles. Although the band is typically larger for riskier funds, groups of funds with different risk profiles (i.e., funds investing different shares of their portfolios in riskier assets) face the same regulatory band. For Lakonishok et al. (1992) herding statistic by asset class considering 18 months before and after the regulatory reform in October 1999. Panel A shows the herding statistic for Fund C by using the asset-specific probability of buying an asset at any point in time. Numbers represent percentages (results are multiplied by 100). Panel B shows p-values for the one-sided t-test of equality of the herding statistic between the observations previous to the regulatory reform (April 1998 to October 1999 Because a given size of a regulatory band should be more binding for riskier funds due to their higher absolute return volatility, we expect to observe more herding in Fund C than in D and E, and in A relative to B. 17 The results in Table 9 tend to support this prediction. When considering herding over all asset classes the table shows that herding in Fund A is higher than that in Fund B. Moreover, herding in Fund C is higher than that in Fund D, which in turn is higher than that in Fund E. Notice that the pattern in Table 9 cannot simply result from a relation between the riskiness of the assets and herding. If that were the case, there should be a decreasing degree of herding as the riskiness of the portfolio declines from Fund A to Fund E. Instead, the decreasing relation occurs only across funds that face similar regulatory bands. This decrease suggests that regulations that lead funds to follow industry benchmarks, such as a minimum return band, might impact the way that funds behave and induce herding. In sum, the evidence provides only mixed support for the idea that some aspects of the regulation might contribute to herding among pension funds.
Also, the lack of available instruments does not drive the herding results. This conclusion can be reached by comparing the number of instruments approved by the Risk-Rating Commission (Comisión Clasificadora de Riesgo, CCR) in various asset classes for the period of 2002 to 2005 and the fraction of approved instruments in which PFAs invest. On average, PFAs invest only in a subset of the available assets, 47 % in the case of corporate bonds. This investment pattern suggests that herding is not driven by the fact that all PFAs purchase the same assets when they become available because they have already exhausted the supply of investable assets. On the contrary, they select the same assets at the same time from a wide range of alternatives. Similar conclusions are reached if one looks at the auctions of government paper and the biddings by PFAs in those public offerings (Opazo et al. 2009 ).
Conclusions
Using unique pension fund data from Chile, this paper advances the understanding of herding behavior and, more generally, the investment practices of institutional investors. In particular, the paper exploits a rich data set to analyze herding behavior among pension funds across different asset classes and levels of the industry. In doing so, it sheds light on the underpinnings of herding and the implications for capital market development.
The paper shows that pension funds herd significantly in their investment decisions. In particular, herding is more pronounced in instruments that are more opaque, which suggests that pension funds copy each other in their investment decisions as a way to overcome informational problems. Herding is more prevalent in corporate and financial-institution bonds, followed by equity, mortgage bonds, and government bonds. These findings are consistent with the view that asset characteristics matter for herding and highlight an important shortcoming of the literature that typically focuses on herding in a particular asset class (equity). The large prevalence of bonds in the portfolios of many institutional investors and the differences we document suggest that the evidence that uses just equity investments 17 The idea is that funds investing in riskier assets will have a higher degree of idiosyncratic volatility if they do not follow the herd, making them more likely to hit the regulatory band. On the other hand, if they always follow the crowd, all risk in their portfolios would be aggregate risk. So, even if their absolute returns are volatile, their relative returns are not. might lead to incorrect conclusions about the magnitude and potential consequences of herding.
Our results also shed light on the relation between competition and herding. We find that herding is more intense when comparing similar types of funds across PFAs than when comparing aggregate PFA portfolios. Narrowly defined fund types are easily compared by the public, the regulator, the overall managers of PFAs, and peers, and thus compete directly with each other across PFAs. We still find evidence of herding at other levels (across PFAs, all PFA-funds together, and various fund types within the same PFA), although less strong. These results are consistent with herding being driven by incentives for managers to be with the pack of their direct competitors and not deviate from industry standards.
Overall, the incentives to herd seem to come from the opaqueness and riskiness of the assets in which funds invest, the endogenous and regulatory driven use of industry benchmarks (not exclusive of Chile), and the existence of a clearly defined group of competitors. Investors and regulators face a tradeoff between the need to monitor asset managers on a regular basis, on the one hand, and the need to give incentives and space to managers to engage in long-term arbitrage and asset discovery, on the other. These incentives on asset allocation by pension funds and other institutional investors might be important and have been typically overlooked by the literature.
Finally, the findings in this paper have implications for the general debate on capital market development, where pension funds are expected to play a key role. 18 On the bright side, pension funds seem to absorb a large amount of the bonds in primary markets. However, the high degree of herding is consistent with pension funds following each other in their investment strategies. 19 Moreover, because pension funds invest only in a fraction of the available assets, herding behavior does not seem to be explained by the lack of investable instruments. In addition, pension funds tend to display relatively little turnover, which does not seem to square well with the idea that they contribute to the liquidity of secondary markets. In sum, the evidence suggests that at least the initial ideas that motivated the introduction of pension funds as a driving force in secondary capital market development need to be revisited.
Appendix 1. The case of Chile: more details
Chile and its pension funds are an interesting case to study. Chile not only is a pioneer and introduced a novel pension fund system, but also continuously improves the regulatory environment such that pension funds become better investment vehicles for pensioners. In addition, Chile fosters the development of mutual funds and insurance companies as alternative and complementary investment vehicles. Aside from reforming the institutional investor base, Chile has more broadly implemented and succeeded in a series of macroeconomic and institutional policies to achieve a stable market-friendly economy, where capital markets play an important role and investors have incentives to participate. Furthermore, among many countries, Chile has been regarded as the example to follow in terms of pension fund and capital market reforms.
When Chile introduced the new pension fund system in 1980, contributors were given the choice of remaining in a national state-run DB system or transferring to the new individual account system. All new entrants to the wage workforce would be automatically enrolled in the new scheme and would select a pension fund administrator (PFA) to manage their accounts. The pension funds have been regulated by the Superintendency of Pensions (Superintendencia de Pensiones, SP).
Although pensioners choose their PFA and the specific funds in which they invest, they cannot select individual investments (assets) themselves. The choice of funds was not always available in the new system; it became more flexible over time as investment regulations were relaxed and options increased. During the first 10 years of the system, each PFA managed a unique fund offering no choice to individuals in terms of risk-return combinations. The set of choices was expanded in March 2000 by the introduction of a new fund type (Fund 2), and in August 2002 by the implementation of the multi-fund scheme in which all PFAs started offering a set of five different funds to their contributors (Funds A to E). Each fund type is subject to different restrictions on its asset allocation. Therefore, the entire set of funds offers more flexibility through different risk-return combinations. Depending on their age and gender profile, contributors can choose among a subset of these five funds. In particular, as pensioners come close to retirement they are forbidden to invest in the more risky funds.
Pension funds manage the pensioners' assets by mostly purchasing securities in capital markets. The managers that the PFAs hire decide the portfolio of each fund and actively reallocate it as they deem necessary. Managers are typically compared with similar funds in other PFAs through returns. Pension funds do not operate like individual life-cycle funds. Moreover, their mandate differs from that of life insurance companies that need to meet the (typically long-term) obligations stipulated in the insurance contracts. They just need to manage the portfolio according to the mandate. Within a PFA, pension fund portfolios are managed separately, but the PFA provides market analysis and asset recommendations for all its funds, resulting in some correlation on portfolio compositions. Most PFAs have managers that specialize in broad asset classes (fixed income and variable income) and participate in the construction of the portfolios of each of the funds.
In terms of the restrictions at the asset level, Chilean PFAs invest in different assets subject to a set of quantitative limits that the law defines and that specify how much pension fund administrators can invest in specific instruments. Pension funds can only invest in assets listed in the pension law and traded in public offerings. These investment limits have been relaxed over time, incorporating quantitative and conceptual changes. However, these limits do not seem to have been binding (except for the case of foreign investments that reached the limit over time). During the multi-fund period of 2002-2005, PFAs invested in only a subset of the assets approved for investment by the Risk-Rating Commission (Comisión Clasificadora de Riesgo, CCR). For example, during this period they invested in 65-72 % of all the approved equity and in 15-18 % of all the approved foreign mutual funds.
Aside from the investment restrictions, pension funds are subject to a minimum return regulation that establishes that administrators are responsible for ensuring an average real rate of return over the last 36 months that exceeds either (i) the average real return of all funds of the same type (i.e., Funds C are benchmarked with other Funds C) minus two percentage points for Funds C, D, and E, and minus four percentage points for Funds A and B, or (ii) 50 % of the average real return of all the funds of the same type, whichever is lower. The average real rate of return to calculate the minimum return changed from 12 months to 36 months in October 1999, giving PFAs more flexibility to deviate in the short term from the industry comparators. PFAs must keep a return fluctuation reserve equal to 1 % of the value of each fund, which is used if the minimum return is not achieved. When the difference is not completely covered by this reserve or the administrator's funds, the state must provide for it. However, in this case or when the reserve is not restored after being used (in a 15-day period), the PFA's operating license can be revoked.
After the introduction of the multi-fund scheme in August 2002, investment limits per instrument set by the central bank did not change for domestic instruments during the period [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . Limits on domestic fixed-income (variable-income) instruments gradually increase (decrease) as funds become less risky. For example, Fund A is the riskiest fund, having the lowest (highest) limits on domestic fixed-income (variable-income) instruments across the five funds. Fund E is the most conservative fund, having the highest limits on fixed-income instruments, the only instruments in which its assets are allowed to be invested. For foreign investments, the limit is set at the PFA level and was relaxed twice during 2003. The maximum allowed by law is 30 % of the value of all funds managed by a single PFA.
Pension funds in Chile are large. Assets under pension fund management increased substantially both in absolute and relative terms. In 2005, pension funds managed around 75 billion dollars, an amount that was almost 2.5 times the 1996 value in real terms. Since their inception in 1981 and 2005, pension funds grew at an average annual rate of 28 % in GDP terms. Furthermore, pension funds held around 10 % of equity market capitalization (which corresponds to around 28 % of free-float), 60 % of outstanding domestic public sector bonds, and 30 % of corporate bonds' capitalization in 2004.
As assets under management expanded, the industry consolidated. The number of PFAs operating in Chile decreased by two-thirds while the number of pension funds doubled. The number of PFAs decreased from 15 to 6 due to a series of mergers and acquisitions that took place mostly in the late 1990s. Because the number of pension funds in the market has been proportional to the number of PFAs, the number of pension funds increased from 15 (one per PFA) to 30 (five per PFA) from July 1996 to December 2005.
